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Clausewitz himself never addressed
politics much, and neither do his suc-
cessors. However, if one assumes that
the United States is the right country
for sheriff, which Gray clearly does,
then it behooves us to pay attention to
what he says.
MARK T. CLARK
Director of the National Security Studies Program
California State University, San Bernardino
Korb, Lawrence J. A New National Security Strat-
egy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons
of Mass Destruction: Three Options Presented as
Presidential Speeches. New York: Council on For-
eign Relations, 2003.
Since the end of the Cold War and the
subsequent demise of the Soviet Union,
the United States has been in search of
a new grand strategy. Over time, the
question “What should be the post–
Cold War U.S. grand strategy?” evolved
into “What should the United States do
with its preeminence?” The answers
provided by the various erstwhile suc-
cessors to George Kennan, who gave us
the Cold War’s “containment,” have
ranged from neo-isolationism—dubbed
“strategic independence” by some of its
advocates—to primacy, the consolida-
tion and indefinite preservation of U.S.
hegemony, of what had initially been
thought to be a “unipolar moment.”
Some, most notably neoconservatives,
have even made the case for a U.S. em-
pire—primacy on steroids.
The declaration by the United States of
a global war on terror following the at-
tacks of 9/11 has done little to bring
closure to the grand strategy debate. In-
deed, the brutally manifest new threat
and the response to it, particularly as
formulated in the Bush administration’s
September 2002 The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America,
and implemented in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, served to further fuel the de-
bate. For many, the boldness, even arro-
gance, exhibited in the administration’s
security strategy, especially the explicit
embrace of “preemption” and the after-
math of the Iraq campaign, have raised
more questions than have been
answered.
It is here that Korb, with this admirably
concise and sharply focused volume,
steps up to the plate. In the tradition of
such previous Council on Foreign Rela-
tions Policy Initiatives as Reshaping
America’s Military by Korb (2002) and
Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy by
Hillen and Korb (2000), Korb here lays
out, in the form of presidential speeches,
three alternative national security
strategies.
As a senior fellow at the Center for
American Progress, former director of
the National Security Studies Program
at the Council of Foreign Relations, and
former assistant secretary of defense,
Korb possesses the intellect and experi-
ence this project requires.
The author takes as his point of departure
the concerns—in some corners, furor—
generated by the Bush administration’s
2002 security strategy. Controversies
surrounding four issues are highlighted:
the embrace of preemption (and appar-
ent abandonment of containment and
deterrence); the willingness to sacrifice
the principles of political and economic
liberalism in the global war on terror-
ism by recruiting the likes of Pakistan’s
President Pervez Musharraf to the
cause, for example; the inclination to go
it alone; and the evident internal ten-
sions and contradictions, particularly
the call for maintaining and enhancing
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U.S. primacy in the face of chronic eco-
nomic challenges.
These issues are featured in assessments
of three alternative national security
strategies. The first alternative, “U.S.
Dominance and Preventive Action,” is
embraced by neoconservatives and
those within the administration and
elsewhere who have been referred to as
“assertive nationalists.” It begins with
the premise that “the most serious
threats to American security come from
the combination of terrorism, rogue
states, and weapons of mass destruc-
tion.” The capability and will to act pre-
emptively and unilaterally are essential;
American military dominance must be
maintained; and U.S. security requires
widespread democracy and capitalism.
The second option, “A More Stable
World with U.S. Power for Deterrence
and Containment,” is said to be favored
by moderate Republicans and Demo-
crats. They share the characterization of
the threat provided by advocates of op-
tion one, yet counsel against elevating
“preemption” to the status of a doc-
trine, emphasize the need for interna-
tional support in the ongoing war on
terror, and warn against the strategic
overextension that may well result from
proactively spreading free-market
democracies.
The distinctly liberal third option, “A
Cooperative World Order,” is reminis-
cent of the Clinton administration’s na-
tional security strategy—“Engagement
and Enlargement,” in Anthony Lake’s
formulation. To the nexus of terror-
ists, rogue states, and weapons of mass
destruction, its proponents add the
longer-term threats posed by “global
poverty, growing lawlessness, and the
increasing isolation of the United
States from like-minded states.” This
multitude of dangers requires
international diplomatic, economic,
and military cooperation; military re-
sponses are not to be given pride of
place. The United States must
strengthen, not tear asunder, interna-
tional norms and institutions. Even the
world’s dominant military power can-
not unilaterally ensure its security.
Korb masterfully translates the three al-
ternatives into full-blown presidential
addresses to Congress and the nation.
He also systematically and evenhand-
edly assesses the strengths, weaknesses,
and political impact of each. Signifi-
cantly, “liberal,” for Korb, is not a
four-letter word. Unlike many Republi-
cans, he knows how to count. This vol-
ume should be required reading for
President George W. Bush, his advisers,
and the broader U.S. national security
community.
ANDREW L. ROSS
Naval War College
Scarborough, Rowan. Rumsfeld’s War. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Regnery, 2004. 253pp. $27.95
Rumsfeld’s War is a close-up look at one
of the most influential figures in the
Bush administration, and a key leader
in the current war against militant
Islamism. The book examines Rumsfeld
the man, reviewing his long and varied
career at the top levels of government
and industry, and analyzes his role in
the two principal themes of his tenure,
transformation of the Cold War mili-
tary and defeat of Middle Eastern
terrorism.
Rowan Scarborough is a well known
Washington Times reporter, specializing
in defense issues. While not a panegyric,
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